We examine companies that issue tracking stock or undertake a minority carve-out. These restructurings create equity claims on a business unit yet the parent retains control. Although the average announcement stock price effect is approximately 3%, our evidence implies that these equity restructurings do not lead to an improvement in operating performance. We conclude that corporate restructuring without a change in control of assets does not enhance operating performance. Like other research, our tests are unable to identify the reasons for the positive stock price effects of tracking stock and minority carve-out arrangements. ________________________________________________________________________ * We thank Jarrad Harford, Randall Heron, Tim Kruse, Megan Partch and participants in a University of Oregon finance roundup for their helpful comments.
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An Investigation of the Gains from Specialized Equity:
Tracking Stock and Minority Carve-Outs
I. Introduction
Typically corporate restructurings modify a firm's financial structure as well as
give up control over some assets. We study a special class of restructurings that modify financial structure without giving up control over assets. Specifically, we examine possible sources of benefits from creating equity claims on a business segment that remains under control of the parent firm. We call such claims specialized equity. Our tests focus on whether the creation of specialized equity enhances firms' operating performance.
We investigate two types of restructuring that create specialized equity for a business unit without giving up control over the unit. One is the creation of tracking stock, sometimes called targeted stock, a relatively recent innovation that has attracted much interest and debate. Tracking stock is nominally equity ownership in a segment of a company's business, and is intended to create a pure play equity claim. Legally, however, tracking stock is a claim on all assets of the firm, and managers of a firm do not relinquish control over the unit with tracking stock.
The other arrangement we study is a special case of equity carve-outs, which we call minority carve-outs. An equity carve-out is an initial public offering of common stock for a business unit. We study only carve-outs where the parent retains majority control of the carved out business for at least two years following the stock offering.
More so than tracking stock, a carve-out creates well-defined equity claims on particular assets. However, like tracking stock, the minority carve-outs we study do not relinquish control over the assets of a business unit.
Our study attempts to isolate the benefits of equity restructuring exclusive of any benefits from the divestiture of assets and improved focus of operations. In other words, we provide evidence on whether separating control over assets, such as in corporate spinoffs, is necessary in order to benefit from creating specialized equity claims on a business unit. Therefore, in addition to learning more about tracking stock and minority carve-outs, we also contribute to our understanding of the valuation effects of more complex restructurings, like spinoffs, that combine the creation of specialized equity with a divestiture of assets.
We find on average that the creation of specialized equity claims is met with a stock price reaction that is comparable to the stock price reactions to spinoffs and to carve-outs in general. We find that the average abnormal return around an announcement of the creation of a tracking stock is 3.6% and the average abnormal return around the announcement of a minority equity carve-out is 2.2%.
Our primary interest is whether the announcement stock price effects of the creation of specialized equity reflects subsequent improvements in operating performance. Specialized equity can more closely link equity-based compensation of managers to their unit's performance, especially for units whose changes in value are not closely correlated. Since in these restructurings there is no change in control over assets and thus no benefits from improved focus, we argue that any favorable effects on operating performance most likely reflect the benefits of gains from improved compensation and incentives of managers of business units.
We find, however, very little evidence that a change in managerial incentives accounts for the increase in shareholder value. On average, we do not find significant improvement in the operating performance of the parent unit, the new unit, or of the two units combined. This contrasts with others' evidence of improved performance following restructurings that result in a change in control over operations, such as Daley, Mehrotra and Sivakumar's (1997) study of spin-offs and Hulburt, Miles and Woolridge's (2000) study of equity carve-outs.
We also investigate the variation in the changes in operating performance following the creation of tracking stock and equity carve-outs as well as the variation in the stock price effects of the announcements of these restructurings. In most regressions our variables for improved compensation of managers are unable to explain the crosssectional variation in operating performance or announcement stock price effects. In just one of several regression tests do we find that subsequent combined operating performance of the two units following the creation of specialized equity claims is greater for firms that rely more on equity based compensation and whose units have low correlation of stock returns.
We also consider two sources of valuation gains that do not imply improved operating performance. One is greater disclosure of information that leads to more accurate valuation of assets. Following an equity restructuring, separate reporting of financial results and other additional public disclosures can enhance investors' ability to value business units, especially units whose measures of performance are not closely correlated. Our examination of the cross-sectional variation in stock price effects fails to uncover evidence in support of this argument.
Another source of value gains is increased expectations of an eventual change in control, such as through a subsequent spinoff or acquisition by another company. That is, specialized equity restructurings can be an early step in a process of divesting a business unit. This argument is that a change in control over assets is necessary for a restructuring to provide benefits to stockholders. However, we find that the stock price effects at announcement are not greater for equity restructurings that are followed by a change in control.
Overall, we conclude that restructurings that do not relinquish control over assets do not bring about improvements in operating performance. In addition, our tests do not explain the source of stock price gains from creating specialized equity. The limited history of companies that create tracking stock or undertake a minority equity carve-out leads us to conjecture that investors anticipated benefits from these restructurings that did not materialize.
II. Sample of specialized equity restructurings
Our sample includes 13 firms that created tracking stock through 1997. These were obtained from a list in Billet and Mauer (2000) . To ensure the completeness of the list we cross checked it against reports in Lexis-Nexis and lists of tracking stock issues provided in D'Souza and Jacobs (2000) and Elder and Westra (1999) . Although the issuance of tracking stocks continued through 2000, we end our sample in 1997 to ensure that we have sufficient data to calculate changes in performance following these transactions. We use the proxy statements filed for these offerings to gather the details of these transactions, such as the shareholders' voting rights and the unit's dividend policy, and to make sure that the issuance of the tracking stock is not part of broader program of restructuring or acquisition. 1 The firms in our sample issued the shares in the new unit either through a public offering or a dividend to shareholders.
Our sample of equity carve-outs consists of 31 transactions that occurred during the period 1994-1996. To construct this sample we use the SDC database to identify all equity carve-outs that were issued between 1994 and 1996 that met several criteria.
Specifically, the parent firm needs to have retained at least 50% of the outstanding shares after the offering; the parent company is a public company; and both the parent company and carved-out unit are traded in the United States. Based on these criteria, we identify a sample of 62 transactions. Because we are interested in transactions that do not result in a change in control, we also require that the parent firm retain control of at least 50% of the voting power of the carved-out unit two years after the offering. We examine whether firms meet this requirement using the proxy statement filed by the carved-out unit two years after the offering. Based on these criteria our final sample consists of 31 observations. For the other 31 observations in which the carve-outs no longer met the 50% ownership criteria, generally either the parent firm spun off the remaining portion of the carved-out unit to its shareholders (16 cases) or the new unit and /or the parent was acquired (11 cases). In 18 of these cases the minority carve-out arrangement lasted for less than one year. For the other 13 cases this arrangement survived for more than one year but less than two.
Although both the tracking stock issues and the carve-outs that we study result in the creation of a specialized equity without a change in control over assets, we recognize that there are differences between the two types of transactions. One distinguishing characteristic is the legal status of these firms following these transactions. Although equity carve-outs do not result in a change of control, the new unit created as the result of an equity carve-out is a separate legal entity from the parent firm. The carved-out unit has a separate board of directors and generally a separate management team from the parent. However, the parent firm maintains control in terms of selecting the firm's board of directors and has considerable discretion in allocating resources of the parent and subsidiary. According to Solomon and Palmiter (1994) , "corporate statutes provide little guidance" and "courts have wavered" on how parent companies deal with majority owned subsidiaries.
The separation between the new unit and the parent is less clear for tracking stock. Tracking stock appears to provide managers and directors with greater discretion than in the case of a minority carve-out. For example, the tracking stock and the parent firm share the same board of directors and managers. Haas (1996) discusses the potential conflict of interest problems that face the directors and managers of companies with tracking stock, and notes the lack of legal guidelines for boards of directors. Because of differences in board and managerial oversight and legal setting of tracking stock and minority carve-out arrangements, we report most of our results for these two samples separately as well as for the combined sample.
Descriptive Characteristics of the Sample
The characteristics of these transactions are shown in Table 1 . The new unit for which specialized equity is created generally has substantially fewer assets than the parent. For example, the median new unit created through the issuance of a tracking stock transaction has assets that are approximately 16% the assets of the parent. For equity carve-outs, the assets of the newly created unit are slightly less than 10% of the parent's total assets. The sizes of the subsidiaries are similar for spinoffs. In Krishna swami and Subramaniam (1999) the spunoff assets are 14% of the surviving parent's assets.
The investment opportunities in the industries in which these firms operate, as measured by market to book value of assets, do not vary significantly between the parent and new unit. In the year of issuance of tracking stocks the median ratio of market to book value of assets is 1.36 in the parent's industry and 1.25 in the new unit's industry.
For equity carve-outs in the year of issuance the market to book ratio varies from 1.52 in the parent's industry to 1.40 in the new unit's industry. It does not appear that the decision to create a new unit is based upon differences in investment opportunities between parent and subsidiary.
The basic operations of the new unit and the parent are often related. For the tracking stock sample, the parent and the unit with tracking stock have the same two-digit SIC code in 36% of the cases, but the same four-digit SIC code in only 8% of the cases.
For the minority carve-outs the parent and carved out unit share the same two-digit SIC code in 53% of the cases and the same four-digit SIC code in 34% of the cases. For spinoffs Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999) report that 25% of the parents and subsidiaries in their sample of spinoffs share the same two-digit SIC code. (They do not report the incidence of overlap for four-digit SIC codes.) It appears that companies with tracking stock and especially companies that undertake a minority carve-out more often have parent and subsidiaries whose lines of business are related. This is consistent with the motivation that spinoffs restructure ownership of assets and increase corporate focus, which does not apply to tracking stock and minority carve-outs.
Valuation effects of equity restructuring announcements
The announcements of the tracking stock issues and equity carve-outs are associated with an average increase in the parent's stock price, as shown in Table 2 . For the tracking stocks in our sample, the average return during the three-day window around this announcement from day -1 to day +1 is 3.6%. For carve-outs the average three-day return is 2.2%. Both of these values are statistically significant (p-value<0.05). For the tracking stock sample 71% of the observations have a positive abnormal return. For the carve-out sample this value is 64%. On average the market expects these equity restructurings to benefit shareholders.
The announcement returns in Table 2 are comparable to those reported by several other studies that have examined related corporate restructurings. For example, Allen and McConnell (1998) report for equity carve-outs an average abnormal announcement return of approximately 2%. Although our sample only consists of carve-outs in which the parent firm retains at least 50% ownership two years after the offering, the announcement returns for our sample are similar to that for all carve-outs. The announcement returns for our sample are also comparable to the abnormal returns around the announcements of spinoffs. As an example, Jain and Desai (1999) find that the average abnormal return around the announcement of a spinoff is 3.8%. We now turn to the question of what can explain the positive valuation effects of equity restructurings that, unlike spinoffs and majority equity carve-outs, do not lead to a change in control or corporate focus.
III. Possible sources of valuation effects
Improve the compensation and incentives of managers
Specialized equity claims potentially improve the correspondence between changes in the value of a firm's assets and managers' compensation. For a firm with disparate operations, stock price changes can be a noisy representation of value changes for specific business segments. Thus, by creating stock whose payouts are related to the performance of a business segment, tracking stock and minority carve-outs can tighten the link between compensation and performance. The restructurings ostensibly lead to better incentives and improved decision-making by managers. By more closely connecting compensation and firm value, specialized equity can also improve the hiring and retention of high quality employees.
Jongbloed (1998) tests the idea that restructurings can improve incentives of managers. He finds that following spinoffs and carve-outs the nature of executive compensation of business segments is related to the nature of assets. This evidence is consistent with the idea that a restructuring leads to compensation policies that are tailored to particular business units. Our interest is in whether this flexibility in compensation leads to valuation benefits when, unlike spinoffs and majority carve-outs, there is no corresponding change in control over assets.
Improve the valuation of assets
Managers and investors cite the difficulty of valuing firms with heterogeneous assets or business segments. For firms with diverse assets a benefit of creating tracking stock or undertaking a minority carve-out is to create separate publicly traded units for which the firm will publicly report measures of performance. The additional separate reporting for business segments, therefore, can reduce the costs to investors and security analysts of valuing diverse business segments as well as the firm as a whole. Thus, some
argue that the creation of equity claims on a segment of a firm's assets reduces an information risk premium and increases investors' valuation of a company.
Other research suggests that such benefits exist. Krishmaswami and Subramaniam (1999) find that the gains from spinoffs are related to proxies for the costs that investors face in valuing a company's diverse business units. Gilson, Healy, Noe, and Palepu (1998) report evidence of an increase in analysts' coverage of companies and an improvement in accuracy of analysts' earnings forecasts following spinoffs, carveouts, and creations of tracking stock.
Some question, however, whether this benefit of specialized equity will materialize when control over assets does not change. For example, Krishmaswami and Subramaniam (1999) argue that a firm can allocate costs between units that remain under the control of one management team. The ability to allocate costs makes the separate performance measures of units less credible when control is not relinquished. They argue that spinoffs, where control is relinquished, are better suited to achieve the benefits of improved disclosure and valuation of assets.
In light of the ability of managers to allocate costs between units, presumably managers create tracking stock or undertake a minority carve-out because there are significant benefits of retaining control over assets. One possibility is that managers enjoy private benefits from control. Another possibility is that the operations of business segments are interrelated in ways that yield synergistic benefits in terms of higher performance and valuation for the firm as a whole.
Pursue a value-maximizing strategy to sell assets
Managers may create tracking stock or undertake a minority equity carve-out and retain control over assets even though the ultimate objective is to sell control. Zingales (1995) and Mello and Parsons (1998) identify reasons that a value-maximizing strategy of selling assets might proceed in stages. Esty (1999) argues that tracking stock, like CalFed Bancorp's litigation participation securities, is a means to improve the valuation of assets of potential acquiring or target companies and facilitate takeovers in situations where assets are difficult to value. So while tracking stocks and minority carve-outs do not transfer control over assets, investors can view these equity restructurings as a step in a process of eventually relinquishing control over a segment, or all, of a firm's assets.
IV. Operating performance around the creation of specialized equity
We examine operating performance from before to after the creation of tracking stock or undertaking a minority carve-out. Of the three sources of valuation effects that we discuss above, only improved compensation and incentives implies a change in the operations of a company. Therefore, our tests on operating performance provide evidence on whether improved compensation and managerial incentives is a motive for and benefit of creating specialized equity.
Changes in firms' operating performance around the creation of specialized equity are reported in Table 3 . We report the change in the operating return on assets for the parent and the new unit. We also report these changes on the overall firm level in which we create a pro-forma statement of operations based on the change in the operations for each unit weighted by the assets of each unit in the year of the offering. Finally, we adjust the change in performance of a sample firm in two ways. First, we adjust performance of the sample firms by the median performance of firms in its industry.
Second, we adjust the sample firms' performance by the median change in performance for the group of firms with a return of assets that is within 0.10 of that of the sample firm in the year prior to the transaction.
Regardless of the sample used or the adjustments made to operating performance, we find no evidence of a change in performance. In fact there is very little change in the return on assets in the period following these transactions. As an example, the median performance-adjusted return on assets among the parent firms in the carve-out sample is 0.010 in the year of the carve-out (year 0) and 0.011 in the two years following a carveout. These results provide little evidence to support the argument that the source of the valuation benefits is expected improvement in operations.
One possible explanation of the lack of significance for the operating results is that the requirement that the minority carve-out arrangement to be in place for two years could potentially lead to a selection bias. This would be the case if the companies that realized the greatest improvements following the carve-out are either spun-off or were acquired soon after the IPO. To investigate this issue, we examine the operating performance at the end of one year of companies that were acquired or spun off within two years after the carve-out offering, and therefore not included in our sample. The operating performance of this group of firms is very similar to the companies in our sample that are shown in panel B of Table 3 . Specifically, the median of the performance-adjusted change in return on assets for this group is -0.007 for the new unit, -0.006 for the parent and 0.014 for the combined firm.
We also examine the performance of companies in which the parent only retained a minority control in the carve-out unit one year after the carve-out. The results for this group are also similar to that for the firms in our sample. The median of the performance-adjusted change in return on assets for this group is 0.000 for the new unit, 0.005 for the parent and 0.005 for the combined firm.
It should be noted that there is substantial cross-sectional variation in operating performance. For example, for units that are created through an equity carve-out, the change in return on assets (matched on prior performance) two years following the carveout ranges from -0.273 to 0.385. Therefore, one possible interpretation of these results is that for some firms these transactions resulted in a substantial improvement in incentives and operations while for other firms these transactions did not improve operations. We turn next to a cross-sectional investigation of the measures of operating performance and stock price effects.
V. Cross-sectional variation in operating performance and stock price effects
Changes in managerial incentives
As discussed earlier, the creation of tracking stock or an equity carve-out creates specialized equity claims that can improve managerial incentives and, therefore, a firm's operating performance. We expect that the change in incentives will be most important in cases in which the difference in the nature of the businesses of the parent and the newly created unit are the greatest. The basis of this argument is that compensation based on a more specialized equity claim will improve managerial incentives to the extent that existing claims on the entire business imprecisely reflect the performance of a unit. In cases in which the new unit's performance is similar to the parent, the potential improvement in incentives will be limited.
The effect of a restructuring on managerial incentives not only depends on the increase in specialization of equity claims from the restructuring but also on the extent to which managers' compensation is tied to the unit's equity performance. We measure the extent of managerial equity-based compensation for each unit as the total change in the value of the CEO's stock and option holdings for a $1 change in the value of the underlying company.
The measure of equity-based compensation is estimated using a methodology described in Core and Guay (1998) and based on data from the proxy statement filed for the first full year following the equity carve-out or the issuance of the tracking stock. We compute the amount by which a one-dollar increase in share price increases the total value of the CEO's stock and option holdings, which we call sensitivity of CEO wealth to share price. This sensitivity of CEO wealth to share price is scaled by the sum of total cash compensation and the sensitivity of CEO wealth to share price. So the value of this ratio can range from 0 to 1. 2 The greater the value of our measure of equity-based compensation the more aligned is the CEOs compensation to the performance of a unit's equity. 3 As discussed above, with tracking stock issues, one CEO oversees both the parent's unit and the tracking stock's unit. Therefore the compensation structure is for the same individual but for two different units. In the case of carve-outs, the parent company has a separate CEO from the unit that has been carved-out.
The change in managerial incentives from these restructurings is predicted to be greater when two conditions exits. First, the unit's stock returns are less closely correlated with the stock returns of the parent and, second, managers' incentives are more closely aligned with the unit's stock price performance. Thus, we predict that the stock price reaction at announcement and the change in operating performance around the restructuring will be greater for firms with a lower correlation between performance of the parent and unit as well as a high level of equity based compensation. We regress both the stock price effects and the change in operating performance on an interaction variable for low correlation and high equity based compensation.
Reduced informational problems
Another source of gains from the creation of tracking stock or an equity carve-out is more complete disclosure of information about a firm's operations. The benefits are more accurate valuation and a lower information risk premium placed on the shares of a company with diverse segments.
Although this informational asymmetry argument is not necessarily mutually exclusive from the improved incentive argument, one difference between these arguments is potential effects operating performances. Unlike the managerial incentive argument, enhanced information and improved valuation of assets do not affect a firm's operations and performance. The benefits from more information about business units, however, should affect share values.
We predict that the problem of obtaining or producing information and valuing a company will be more important for firms with more diverse operations. Therefore, we test whether the stock price reaction to the announcement of tracking stock or an equity carve-out is greater when the operations of the parent and unit are more diverse. We measure the diversity by the correlation between the operating performance of the parent and unit. We presume that valuation is based on measures of operating performance, so we focus on correlation between operating performance measures rather than correlation between stock returns. The benefits of reducing the costs of valuation imply that the stock price reaction is greater the lower is the correlation between the operating performance of the parent and unit.
Expected change in control
A third source of possible valuation gains is that the restructuring of equity leads investors to raise their expectation of a change in control of the parent, the unit, or both parent and unit. That is, the creation of specialized equity is viewed as a step in a process of selling control over some of the firm's assets or spinning off these assets. This argument implies no effect on operating performance, but the stock price reaction to an announcement of tracking stock or an equity carve-out should be greater in those cases where the announcement raised expectations of change in control.
In our test we assume that as a result of the announcements of tracking stock and minority carve-outs investors anticipate the gains from eventual changes in control. We regress stock price effects on a dummy variable for the occurrence of purchase of control of the parent or the unit by another company. We define a change in control as an acquisition of the parent and/or the new unit within five years following the restructuring.
Using this definition of a change in control we find that about 35% of the carve-outs and about 60% the tracking stock cases we study realize a change in control following this restructuring.
Variable definitions and estimates of regressions on operating returns
The dependent variable in Table 4 is an adjusted change in operating performance for the combined parent and unit. Adjustments are made for the performance of firms with comparable pre-event performance.
The incentive variable is a dummy variable that is set equal to one if the stock correlation is below the median for the sample and the equity compensation variable is above the median for the sample. The correlation of industry stock returns is used to measure the difference in operations between the parent and the new division. This correlation is measured as monthly stock returns of the parent's and the carve-out's industry for the five years around the carve-out or tracking stock issue. As described above, the equity-based compensation is the change in the wealth of the unit's CEO in response to a $1 change in the value of the unit's stock price.
In addition to the incentive related variable, we include two control variables in these regressions to account for other possible differences in operations. These variables include the size and investment opportunities of the units. We measure a unit's size by the book value of assets and its investment opportunities by the ratio of market to book value of assets.
The estimate of this regression is in column 1 of Table 4 . In general, the results do not support the argument that the primary source of the gains from the issuance of specialized equity claims is improved managerial incentives. Overall, the regression is insignificant.
These regression results are similar when we consider alternative measures for a firm's operating performance. 4 However, o ne estimation that differs from those presented in panel A is a regression that includes only firms that were 100% owned by the parent firm prior to the carve-out. Four of the carve-outs in our sample are for firms in which the parent owned a majority of the carve-out unit both before and after the carve-out. These firms owned an average of 89% of the parent prior to the carve-out while the other shares were privately held by other investors, often firms affiliated with the parent. The parent owned an average of 72% of the new unit following the carve-out.
When we exclude these four firms, the incentive interaction variable becomes statistically significant (p-value = 0.04). The substantial change in estimates is attributable to dropping one of the four excluded carve-outs that experienced unusually positive performance after year 0.
The results from this regression shown in column 2 indicate that improvement in performance following the issuance of specialized equity claims is greatest when the correlation between the new unit and parent's stock returns are below the median of the sample and the degree of equity compensation is above the median of the sample. With the exception of this regression, however, we do not find evidence that operating returns on assets are related to our variable for the potential for benefits from improved managerial compensation and incentives.
Variable definitions and estimates of regressions on announcement stock price effects
As a further attempt to identify the gains from the issuance of specialized equity claims, we regress the stock price reaction to the announcement of tracking stock or an equity carve-out on variables that correspond to the three potential effects discussed above. The first is the interaction variable described above that represents the potential incentive benefits of specialized equity claims. Benefits from improved incentives imply The estimate of this regression is reported in column 3 of Table 4 . The regression is insignificant and offers no support for any of the three potential sources of gains:
improved incentives, improved valuation, or an increase in the likelihood of acquisition.
The results from these regressions are similar when we include a dummy variable for the retention of the proceeds from equity carve-outs to control for Allen and McConnell's (1998) finding that stock price effects are lower when firms retain the proceeds. Our regressions are also insignificant when we consider the returns for the five-day window around this event and various combinations of the explanatory variables. Overall, our cross-sectional tests do not help us explain why the stock market reacts favorably to the announcement of tracking stock or minority equity carve-outs.
Based on the insignificant regressions as well as the insignificant median changes in operating performance, we conclude that tracking stock and carve-outs do not improve incentives in a way that leads to measurable increases in operating performance. In addition, the regressions do not support the idea that increases in stock prices around announcements of tracking stock and carve-outs reflect the benefits of improved valuation or an eventual change in control. Next we discuss our findings in relation to related studies.
VI. Discussion of related evidence
Tracking stock
Several other studies investigate tracking stock. Murphy (1989) , Logue, Seward and Walsh (1996) and Haas (1996) provide detailed discussions of various features of tracking stock, the stated motivations for them, and their potential advantages and disadvantages. As we do, Billet and Mauer (1998), Zuta (1999) , Elder and Westra (1999) , D'Souza and Jacob (2000) and Chemmanur and Paeglis (2000) document the positive stock price reaction on average to the announcement of tracking stock proposals.
Given the short history and small number of tracking stock issues, the samples largely overlap.
Other researchers have employed a variety of methods to investigate the potential benefits of tracking stock. Like ours, however, other research has not had much success in identifying benefits of tracking stock that explain the positive stock price reactions.
Zuta (1999) finds a decline the diversification discount of firms that create of tracking stock, which is an alternative method of measuring an increase in market value. She attributes the decline in diversification discount to improvements in investment efficiency, but it appears that these increases in value, just like the announcement effects on stock price, could reflect other sources of benefits that are unrelated to effects on investment efficiency.
Chemmanur and Paeglis (2000) and Zuta (1999) report that the number of analysts following companies increases after the creation of tracking stock. This is consistent with the idea that tracking stock increases the amount of information produced about these firms. However, neither study establishes a link between the increase in the number of analysts following the companies and the stock price effects of the announcement of tracking stock. Billet and Vijh (2000) examine analysts' forecasts and stock price reactions to forecasts and find no evidence to support the idea that information problems are mitigated by the creation of tracking stock.
Chemmanur and Paeglis (2000) 
Minority equity carve-outs
Zuta (2000) studies minority carve-outs and examines how investment efficiency in diversified firms changes following the creation of a public ownership stake in a business segment. She hypothesizes that agency problems will decrease following a minority carve-out, presumably because of improved compensation and incentives of managers. On average, she finds a positive stock price reaction to announcements of minority carve-outs. She also documents an increase in measures of excess value (or decline in diversification discounts), which are consistent with or the consequence of a favorable stock price reaction. However, she finds no statistically significant change in a measure of firm's investment efficiency following carve-outs. Thus, like our evidence, Zuta's findings do not establish that specialized equity in the form of a minority carve-out enhances corporate performance.
The various studies of tracking stock and minority carve-outs all find positive stock price reactions, but none of the studies is able to provide persuasive empirical support for an economic rationale for these restructurings. At this point, we are in the unsatisfying position of not understanding what benefits were anticipated and realized by the creation of specialized equity.
VII. Conclusions
We study one facet of corporate restructurings, namely the creation of specialized equity claims. Our sample consists of the creation of tracking stock and carve-outs of equity that do not lead to the loss of control over assets. By design tracking stock arrangements do not divest assets. The equity carve-outs we study create a publicly traded company that remains under the control of the parent. These two types of restructurings therefore create equity claims that are linked to the performance of a business unit that remains under the control of the parent company. Thus, the events give us an opportunity to examine the benefits of creating specialized equity in the absence of any benefits from disposing assets and increasing corporate focus.
Like others, we find that tracking stock and equity carve-outs are me t by positive stock price reactions. Investors appear to anticipate benefits from the creation of specialized equity without an accompanying change in control. We examine operating performance following the creation of tracking stock and equity carve-outs to test for the possible benefits of improved incentives of managers. We find no improvement in the operating performance of companies. This evidence suggests that an equity restructuring needs to accompany a change in control in order to enhance the operating performance of a business unit. We conclude that specialized equity and any effects on managerial incentives are not sufficient to improve a firm's operations.
The lack of improvements in operating performance points toward other benefits of these arrangements. We test whether the favorable stock price effects reflect reduced information problems for investors. We also test whether the stock price effects reflect the anticipation of an eventual acquisition of the parent or unit. We find no support for either of these hypotheses. At this point, an explanation for the positive stock price effects of tracking and minority carve-outs eludes us.
We conjecture that the stock price effects do not reflect real benefits of specialized equity arrangements. That is, investors may have erred in their collective judgment that equity restructurings enhance the value of assets. Given the infrequent incidence and short history of equity restructurings, especially creations of tracking stock, it is possible that investors misjudged the gains from these events. In addition, the elimination of several tracking stocks, such as those created by Pittston, USX and Disney, and the short duration of many equity carve-outs, as documented by Klein, Rosenfeld and Beranek (1991) , are consistent with managers recognizing that these arrangements do not provide sustained benefits. Table 1 Description of tracking stock and minority equity carve-out events
The table includes summary statistics for a sample of 13 tracking stocks and 31 equity carve-outs. The tracking stock sample includes all companies that issued tracking stocks prior to January 1998. Tracking stock issues that were part of a merger transaction are not included in these tests. The equity carve-out sample includes equity carve-outs issued between 1994 and 1996 in which the parent firm retained at least a 50% control of the carve-out unit's equity for at least two years. The parent firm is the firm with more assets following the transaction. The market to book ratio is defined as (mkt value of equity + total assetsshareholders' equity)/total assets. The market value of equity is calculated as the product of the closing price for the period and the number of shares outstanding. Equity based compensation is defined as the delta value of stockholdings and options held by the CEO. The delta value is defined as the change in the CEO's wealth from a $1 change in the underlying stock. Total compensation is the sum of equity based compensation and cash compensation. Operating performance is defined as the ratio of operating income (COMPUSTAT data item 13) to yearend total assets (COMPUSTAT data item 6). Industry Adjusted is calculated by subtracting the operating performance of the sample firm from the median ROA of all firms with a two-digit SIC that is the same as the sample firm in the year of the issue. Performance Adjusted is calculated by subtracting the sample firm's operating performance from the median ROA for all firms in COMPUSTAT that exhibit an ROA within ten percentage points of the sample firm in the year prior to the issue. Combined operating performance is the pro-forma operating performance of the subsidiary and the parent weighted by year-end assets for the year in which the tracking stock is issued or the carve-out is undertaken. Year refers to the year relative to the year of the issuance. The sample is described in Table 1 . * indicates that the value is significantly different from zero at the 10% level, ** indicates that the value is significantly different from zero at the 5% level, and *** indicates that the value is significantly different from zero at the 1% level. Table 4 Regressions on operating performance and announcement stock price effects
Tracking stock Minority carve-outs
The dependent variable for all of these regressions is the performance-adjusted change in return on assets, which is defined in Table 3 . Regression 2 excludes companies in which the parent owned less than 100%of the units assets prior to the issuance of tracking stock or equity carve-out. Assets are the total assets of the unit in year zero. For the regressions on the combined firm assets are the total assets of both units. Marketto-book is the median market to book for the industry that the unit operates. For the combined regressions this value is the market to book weighted by the assets of each unit. Correlation of stock returns is the correlation in monthly stock returns between the parent unit and new unit for the five years around the issuance of a tracking stock or equity carve-out. Equity Based compensation is the change in CEO's wealth for a $1 in the price of the companies stock. This value is scaled by the sum of equity based compensation and total cash compensation. Incentive dummy is a dummy variable that is set equal to 1 if the correlation between the unit's stock returns are less than the median of the sample and equity based compensation is greater than the median of the sample. Index for subsequent acquisition of parent or new unit is a dummy variable if the parent or new unit is acquired within five years after the equity carve-out or issuance of the tracking stock. Use index is dummy variable that is set equal to one if the cash raised from the equity carve-out is retained and zero otherwise. p-values are in parentheses.
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